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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
CLUB STANYON STREET, a Utah 
non-profit membership 
corporation, 
Petitioner, 
-~ 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 16384 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, a private liquor club, asks this court 
to review a Utah Liquor Control Commission order suspending 
the club's liquor license for one week. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
Subsequent to a hearing before the Utah Liquor Control 
Corrunission, the Commission adopted findings of a violation of 
Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code Annotated, (unlawful sale to 
a non-member) and of a violation of Rule A96-0l-5:6.a., (use 
of a club facility by a non-member). The Commission assessed 
a penalty suspending the club's liquor license for one week. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent, Utah Liquor Control Commission requests 
this court to uphold the Commission's Findings and Order of 
March 7, 1979, which suspends the club's liquor license for 
a one week period. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner Club Stanyon Street (hereinafter referred 
to as "Stanyon Street" and "club") is a non-profit corporation 
organized as a private club under Article I of Title 16, Utah 
Code Annotated, (Private Club Act) for the purpose of operating 
a liquor locker club for the benefit of its members. Club 
Stanyon Street is licensed by the Utah Liquor Control Com-
mission with authority to store, serve, consume and sell 
liquor. 
Pursuant to due notice of violations of the Utah 
Liquor laws and regulations, a hearing was held on March 7, 
1979. Testimony was elicited from an agent of the State 
Liquor Law Enforcement Division that on November 14 and 22, 
1978, the agent entered the club's liquor consumption area 
and ordered and paid for two drinks (Transcript of March 7, 
1979, hearing at pp. 16 and 23). At the hearing the club 
was represented by its corporate officer and by counsel. 
The hearing was conducted before four members of the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission. 
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After consideration of the facts, circumstances and 
testimony at the hearing of the matter, the Commission found 
that there were two violations, a sale to a non-member in 
violation of Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code Annotated, and 
an unauthorized use of the club premises by a non-member 
contrary to Rule A96-01-5:6.a., Utah Liquor Control Commission 
Regulations. (Transcript of March 7, 1979, hearing at p. 71). 
The Commission then ordered that the club's liquor license be 
suspended for one week. 
The club now petitions for a review of that order 
of suspension. 
ARGU!>IBNT 
POINT I 
THE RIGHT OF A LIQUOR CLUB LICENSED BY 
THE STATE TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES WAS NOT VIOLATED BY AN OFFICER 
OBTAINING LIQUOR DURING REGULAR HOURS. 
Petitioner Club Stanyon Street (herein referred to 
as "Stanyon Street" and "club") as a private liquor club holds 
a corporate charter and liquor license in the State of Utah. 
Stanyon Street claims it has a constitutional right to be 
:ree from warrantless searches which was violated by officers 
entering the club and obtaining liquor in an unlawful sale 
to them as non-members. The club does not deny the sale or 
cSK for suppression of the evidence, or that the violation 
be overturned, but simply states that the conduct of the 
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officers violated a right. 
The club relies heavily on the Third District Court 
Memorandum Opinion of Judge Christine M. Durham in the case 
of V-1 Oil Company, et al. v. Salt Lake City, C-79-75, 
February 8, 1979. That case dealt strictly with issues 
arising out of criminal charges in enforcement of food 
preparation and health inspection ordinances at a local 
service station. The decision is clearly not applicable 
to liquor control as is the case at hand. The opinion itself 
recognizes the distinction: 
Most recently, in the 1979 case of Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 1816, the Court 
applied its holdings in Camara and See to 
inspections authorized by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970. That opinion 
distinguishes a parallel line of cases per-
mitting warrantless searches in certain 
industries which "have such a history of 
government oversight that no reasonabl~ 
expectation of privacy could exist for a 
proprietor over the stock of such an enter-
prise." 98 S.Ct., at 1821. Liquor and fire-
arms constitute such industries (See the 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 
397 U.S. 72, 1970, and United States v. Loarn 
Anthony Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 1972), and a 
recent federal district court decision in-
cludes coal mining within that limited class. 
See Marshall v. Donofris, No. 78-2667, OSHR, 
Nov. 14, 1978, p. 1175, reported in 47 Law 
Week 2411. Defendants here [Salt Lake City] 
argue that food preparation is such a heavily 
regulated industry, but aside from the base 
assertion, no facts or historical review is 
offered to show the kind of regulation and 
governmental oversight (federal in nature) 
found in Colonnade and Biswell, supra. 
V-1 Oil Company v. Salt Lake City, C-79-75, 
1979, Memorandum Decision by Christine M. 
Durham, District Judge (emphasis supplied). 
-4-
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Judge Durham's decision reinforces the fact that 
liquor is an intensely regulated industry wherein warrantless 
searches have much broader use and application that in the 
area of health and safety inspections with which she was 
dealing. 
In addition, the club relies on two cases wherein 
city ordiances were successfully challenged. But those two 
cases are clearly different on both the facts and the law. 
The Vagabond Club and the Joe Wheeler cases dealt 
with overly broad city ordinances which purported to allow 
police to inspect premises unlimited to time and unlimited to 
business area even to the extent of furnishing a key to the 
police. In the Vagabond Club the ordinance was specifically 
unconstitutional because of its provisions, one of which 
would "compel the clubs to provide a key to the police .•• ". 
State of Utah v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (1968) at p. 
696. In the subsequent Joe Wheeler case the ordinance went 
too far because it in effect required" ... the proprietor to 
unlock the door at any time from the inside,- all to accomplish 
llie same objective, - a look-see of all the premises", Salt 
Lake City v. Joe Wheeler, 466 P.2d 838, at p. 840. These 
cases are clearly not applicable to the matter at hand. 
However, the fundamental question here is not whether 
a warrant was involved, but whether the officers' conduct was 
reasonable under the circumstances. Respondent submits that the 
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conduct of the officers in entering the club for the purpose 
of detecting violations and ordering a drink does not constitute 
a "search". However, if such conduct on the part of an officer 
can possibly be classified as a warrantless search or inspec-
tion, respondent submits that the conduct was in fact reasonable 
and therefore not in violation of any right: 
The constitution only prohibits searches that 
are unreasonable, and the unreasonableness of 
the search is to be determined from the attendant 
circumstances. State of Utah v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 
543 (1979) I a P• 545. 
A private club seeking the privilege from the state 
to deal in intoxicating liquors cannot expect the same pro-
tection regarding warrantless searches that can be expected 
by ordinary business because of the state's greater interest 
in regulating the use and sale of liquor in order to protect 
the public welfare: 
There is a great difference in the amount 
of police regulation permitted where intoxi-
cating liquor is involved as opposed to the 
ordinary business enterprises. The law is 
stated 45 Am.Jur.2d, Intoxicating Liquors, 
as follows: 
.•• The power of a state to regulate 
or prohibit the ... possession, sale, 
.•. or use of intoxicating liquors is 
a matter of universal recognition .... 
[Sec. 23. J 
* * * 
The state has far broader power and 
greater latitude to regulate and restrict 
the use, distribution, or consumption of 
liquor than to regulate or restrict ordi-
nary business, because of the effect of 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the former on the health and welfare of 
the public. [Sec. 24.] 
Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 481 P.2d 669 (1971) 
at p. 670. 
The purpose of the constitutional right is to protect 
the privacy and security of the individual against unreasonable 
intrusion by governmental authority. But there are exceptions 
where a liquor club injects itself voluntarily into the vary 
area that must be open to pervasive government scrutiny in 
order to protect the welfare of society. Warrantless inspections 
of premises have generally been upheld as reasonable in areas 
of special concern to society such as firearms, drugs or 
intoxicating liquors. 
Certain industries have such a history of 
government oversight that no reasonable 
expectation of priva~y •.. could exist for 
a proprietor over the stock of such an 
enterprise. Liquor and firearms are in-
dustries of this type; when a entrepreneur 
embarks upon such a business he has vol-
untarily choosen to subject himself to a 
full arsenal of governmental regulation. 
* * * 
The element that distinguishes these enter-
prises from ordinary business is a long 
tradition of close government supervision, 
of which any person who chooses to enter 
such a business must already be aware. 
"A central difference between those cases 
•.. and this one [Barlow's] is that busi-
nessmen engaged in such federally licensed 
and regulated enterprises accept the burdens 
as well as the benefits of their trade; 
whereas the petitioner here [Barlow's] was 
not engaged in any regulated or licensed 
business. The businessman in a regulated 
-7-
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industry in effect consents to the restrictions 
placed upon him." Almeida - Sanchez v. United 
States (citation omitted), Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 98 S.Ct. 
I8Ib (1979). 
Respondent submits that the conduct of the officers 
was reasonable in the context of the enforcement of liquor 
law in a closely regulated enterprise. However, if the 
conduct is considered a search at all it was authorized for 
any one of several reasons: 
First, Utah liquor law expressly authorizes peace 
officers to enter into club rooms or meeting rooms of clubs 
in order to determine whether the law is being violated. 
All peace officers shall have the right 
to enter the club rooms or meeti.ng rooms 
of social clubs, recreational or athletic 
associations or kindred associations in-
corporated under the provisions of this 
chapter, for the purpose of determining 
whether any laws or ordinances are being 
violated therein. Section 16-6-14, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
Second, at the time the license was granted and prior Ii 
to the entry and sale to the officers, the club gave its expres: 
I 
written consent for representatives of law enforcement agencie, 
to enter for inspection purposes and waived its constitutional 
rights in connection with such inspections. See "Consent to 
Inspection" by Club Stanyon Street (Appendix A of this brief)· 
A waiver of constitutional rights even in criminal 
matters is considered to be a valid action where liquor is 
concerned: 
-8-
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... in a number of cases it has been 
held that searches for, or seizures of, 
intoxicating liquor, or evidence of 
violation of the liquor laws, without a 
warrant, were justified on the ground 
of consent to the search or a waiver of 
constitutional rights. 45 Arn.Jur.2d, 
Intoxicating Liquors, 470. 
Where the public has a special interest in strict 
control of liquor, a consent and waiver has been held valid 
and reasonable in light of police power of the state to 
control alcoholic beverages: 
We agree with the Ohio court that 
one who applies for and is issued a 
permit to sell alcoholic beverages 
thereby assents to the reasonable and 
lawful conditions imposed by statute 
and rule and find that due to the 
potentiality of criminal activity in 
the liquor business there is no con-
stitutional objection to requiring 
consent to a warrantless search as 
a prerequisite to the issuance of a 
liquor license. The State of Illinois 
could completely prohibit the sale of 
liquor, but having instead chosen to 
regulate it, any restriction or require-
ment such as consent to a warrantless 
search which is necessary to protect 
the public health, safety and morals, 
is a reasonable exercise of the police 
power of the state. Daley v. Berzanskis, 
269 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. 1971) at p. 719. 
Cert. Denied, 91 s.ct. 2173. 
In the foregoing case, the court concluded that it 
was incorrect to supress evidence obtained without a valid 
warrant because "Considering the nature of the business we 
do not believe that a close scrutiny of the operation of the 
-9-
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business through warrantless searches is unreasonable or 
arbitrary." Daley v. Berzanskis, supra, at p. 718. 
Third, consent of the state to monitor compliance 
is clearly implicit where the club intends to subject itself 
to the strict liquor control laws, incorporates as a private 
club and then applies for and receives a license and posts 
a bond as required for the "faithful compliance" of all the 
state liquor laws. Section 16-6-13.1(1), Utah Code Annotated. 
Moreover, upon establishment of a state store the club officer 
as vendor of the state store specifically agrees to comply with 
the law regarding conduct of the state store and the sale of 
liquor, Section 32-1-37, Utah Code Annotated, as applied to 
a private club by Section 16-6-13.1(6), Utah Code Annotated. 
In sununary of Point I, the law is clear that Club 
Stanyon Street has no right to be free from warrantless searches 
only to be free from an unreasonable search under the circum-
stances. The conduct of the officers does not amount to a 
"search". Nevertheless, what was done was only reasonable 
under the circumstances of a liquor business so carefully 
licensed and closely regulated in the public interest. 
POINT II 
A SALE TO A NON-MEMBER IS A VIOLATION 
OF UTAH LIQUOR LAWS BY THE CLUB. 
The club contends that the liquor laws regarding 
sales apply only to persons purchasing liquor and therefore 
-10-
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the club is relieved from any responsibility for its sales. 
Respondent disagrees. The transfer by the licensee club to 
one not a member is the prohibited conduct whether called a 
"sale" or a "purchase". The applicable law is set forth as 
follows: 
No person other than a member or guest who 
holds a valid guest card issued pursuant 
to subsection 16-6-13.7(13) may make any 
purchase from a state store located on the 
premises of a social club, recreational, 
athletic, or other kindred association. 
Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code Annotated. 
Stanyon Street's contention would warp this law to 
excuse the club from any responsibility for an unlawful sale. 
Respondent submits that the purpose of the law is to make a 
purchase from a club by a non-member a violation by the club 
for an unlawful sale. The transfer by the club is not authorized, 
and it is therefore unlawful for both the club and the purchaser. 
The rule is found in the list of restrictions clearly 
applying to the operation by a licensee of a private club. 
Section 16-6-13.l, Utah Code Annotated. Specifically, the 
license and bond under which the club conducts its operation 
are: 
... conditioned upon the faithful compliance 
by the non-profit corporation, its officers, 
agents, and employees with the provisions 
of this chapter and the Utah Liquor Control 
Act of 1969 .... Section 16-6-13.l(l), Utah 
Code Annotated. 
Also, the law regarding the responsibilities of vendors 
cf state stores is clear. Where a state store is established 
-11-
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in a club, the club itself or an officer or employee of the 
club is the vendor and is subject to bonding for compliance 
under the Liquor Control Act, Section 16-6-13.1(6), Utah Code 
Annotated. This means that the club itself as vendor 
... shall be responsible for the carrying 
out of the act and the regulations, so 
far as they relate to the conduct of such 
store and the sale of liquor thereat .... 
Section 32-1-37, Utah Code Annotated. 
Moreover, the club as vendor only " ... may sell to any 
person such liquor as that person is entitled to purchase in 
conformity with the provisions of this act and the regulations 
" • • • I Section 32-1-39, Utah Code Annotated. 
Moreover, it is unlawful for anyone to sell liquor 
except as authorized by law, Section 32-7-1, Utah Code Annotatec, 
and the law especially emphasizes that vendors or their employees 
cannot sell liquor in any way not expressly authorized by law: 
No person authorized to sell liquor in 
accordance with the provisions of this act, 
and no clerk, employee or agent of such 
person shall sell or furnish liquor in any 
other place or at any other time or other-
wise than as authorized by this act. Section 
32-7-4, Utah Code Annotated. 
Clearly, taking the liquor law a a whole, with its inter-relate: i 
provisions, the responsibility is dir~ctly upon the club or its 
officer or employee as the vendor to supervise and restrict 
the sale of liquor to those sales which are lawful. The club 
as liquor licensee must be held responsible for a violation. 
-12-
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l 
To summarize Point II, in light of the clear purpose 
and intent of the law, allowing an unauthorized purchase is a 
violation by a licensee. Specifically, a licensee selling a 
drink to (allowing a purchase by) a person other than a member 
or a guest clearly violates Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code 
Annotated, for the purposes of an administrative hearing to 
determine whether a license should be suspended or revoked. 
Otherwise, if the club has no responsibility to limit 
its sales to authorized members and guests only, then sales 
will be made to anyone, and there would be no effective way 
to enforce the law. such a free and open flow of liquor would 
totally destroy the concept of a private liquor club, a con-
sequence clearly not contemplated by the strict provisions of 
the Utah liquor laws. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION HAS 
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE AND PROHIBIT UN-
AUTHORIZED USE OF THE PRIVATE LIQUOR 
CLUB PREMISES. 
Stanyon Street questions the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission's authority to promulgate paragraph 6.a. of Rule 
5, Utah Liquor Comission Regulations: 
No person shall be granted the use of the 
premises of a locker club except members, 
guests and visitors. 
It is noted that the club does not contest the fact 
that the club allowed use for a sale to a non-member contrary 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the above rule. The claim is simply that "the Commission 
has no authority to regulate the activity it seeks to control". 
(Club's brief at page 14). In other words, the Commission 
has no power to prohibit persons who are not members, guests 
or visitors from use of the club premises for purposes of 
buying,storing and consuming liquor. 
Respondent submits that the Commission has full 
authority under the law to prohibit the use of licensed premises 
by unauthorized persons. The law is very clear as to just what 
a "premises" is: 
"Premises" means any room enclosure, 
building, or structure where alcoholic 
beverages may be lawfully manufactured, 
stored, sold, or consumed, and also in-
cludes those areas within the boundary 
of the private locker club. Rule A96-
0l-l :2. s. 
This definition is consistent wit.h the statutory 
definition of "premises", Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
as incorporated into the Private Club Act, Section 16-6-12.1 
(1), Utah Code Annotated. The use of the premises for purposes 
of storing, consuming and serving of liquor is unlawful except : 
upon permission of the state through a liquor license, Section 
16-6-13.1 (4), Utah Code Annotated. The commission's authority 
to license a premises is the authority to prescribe reasonable 
conditions for the use of that premises regarding alcoholic 
beverages. Where the club purports to be private, for the 
benefit of its own participating members only, a regulation 
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limiting the use of the premises to members, guests and visitors 
is reasonable in light of the purpose of the law. If any 
person, regardless of authority, can use the club premises, 
then the club ceases to be a private club and becomes essen-
tially open to any of the public who may desire access. 
The club contends that it should be free to determine 
how the premises and facility are to be used so as to permit a 
person not a member, guest or visitor to play golf or tennis. 
The argument overlooks the fact that the club's premises is 
defined by the club itself in its application for permission 
to sell, store, serve and consume liquor on a particular 
"premises". The club initally controls the extent of the 
premises defined exclusively for private members and voluntarily 
subjects that premises to state regulation in the first place. 
Allowing free and open usage is directly contrary to 
the legislative intent to exclude the general public. Appli-
cants for membership in a club are prohibited from admittance 
to the premises until they have been voted on and approved by 
the members of the club, and until seven days after application 
for membership, Section 16-6-13.7(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Also, non-member guests may not use the premises unless they 
have been duly authorized by a member, Section 16-6-13.7(10), 
Utah Code Annotated. If the law contains such provisions to 
prohibit unauthorized persons from use of the premises, then 
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how can the CollUllission lack authority to enforce those provisior 
as the club contends? Respondent submits that the law is clearl 
intended. to make the private club actually private, and to au0, 
use by any person without authority would frustrate that purpose 
in the law. 
regulation 
Moreover, the Commission has express power to make a 
••• governing the conduct, management and 
equipment of any premises upon which al-
coholic beverages may be sold or consumed. 
Section 32-1-B(r), Utah Code Annotated. 
Respondent submits that when the law is viewed from 
the perspective of a private, non-profit club "organized pri-
rnarily for the benefit of its members", Section 16-6-12.1(2), 
Utah Code Annotated, a regulation prohibiting the use of the 
premises and prohibiting access by persons having no authority 
by law or by official club permission is a reasonable exercise 
of the Commission's authority. Otherwise, the club becomes 
open to the public and the concept of a private club, devoted 
exclusively to the use and benefit of tis members, becomes 
meaningless. Stanyon Street in its argument refers to the 
remarks of one of the Commissioners as a basis for alleging 
that there exists a Commission policy of non-enforcement of 
Rule 5:6.a. The clubs argument begs the question: If there 
were a policy of non-enforcement by the Commission, then there 
would be no violation in this case and no appeal. Contrary 
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to the club's argument, the personal opinion of one Commissioner 
alone cannot be taken as a policy set by the whole Commission. 
The rule in on the books, it is valid, it was enforced in this 
case, a violation was found, and the Commission voted for 
suspension. The rule and the penalty should be upheld. 
POINT IV 
THE INTENT OF THE LICENSEE TO VIOLATE 
THE LIQUOR LAWS IS NOT A NECESSARY 
ELEMENT IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LIQUOR 
CONTROL COMMISSION. 
A hearing before the Liquor Commission is an admini-
strative proceeding to determine whether the liquor laws have 
been violated and which does not require that intent or know-
ledge be found on the part of the licensee in order to conclude 
that there was a violation of the liquor laws or to assess a 
suspension or revocation of the license. The proceedings are 
not criminal in nature and the standards of the criminal law 
do not apply. The general rule of law is that: 
A liquor license may be revoked for the 
making of unlawful sales or other violations 
of the liquor laws by employee or agents 
of the licensee without the latters knowledge 
and contrary to his instructions. Thus, a 
liquor license may be revoked where employees 
of the licensee solicit patrons to buy them 
drinks, or permit others to do so, in vio-
lation of the liquor laws, even though such 
acts of solicitation are done without the 
knowledge of the licensee. 45 Arn.Jur.2d, 
Intoxicating Liquors, Section 188. 
The club does not deny the sale of liquor but attempts 
to explain the sales away in that "Each of the alleged incidents 
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occurred because of simple human error or oversight". (Club's 
brief, p. 18). The licensee is responsible for that oversight. 
There was in fact a violation even though the licensee may 
not have had knowledge of that violation. Surely the question 
of intent is a material issue to an individual defending a 
criminal charge which might result in incarceration; but here 
we are not dealing with the criminal law or a defendant but 
rather with a licensee and a potential revocation of his 
privilege to deal with liquor. In this area the intent of the 
licensee is not an essential element nor is lack of intent 
clearly designated in the law as an absolute defense. The 
true question is whether the record supports the findings of 
a violation and the order of suspension. The record is clear 
and the order should be upheld. 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSION'S PROCEDURE FOR NOTICE AND 
HEARING DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW; 
THE CLUB IS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL CIVIL DIS-
COVERY NOR TO A PRE-HEARING VISUAL INSPEC-
TION OF THE ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 
Due process for an administrative hearing requires 
that a licensee be given notice of the allegations of the 
violation and an opportunity to be heard on those allegations 
at a fair hearing and an opportunity to be represented by 
counsel at the time of the hearing. These requirements were 
fulfilled in this case as is adequately demonstrated by the 
I 
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record. Thus, the club's right to due process before the 
administrative body was protected within the law. 
Contrary to the club's argument, the requirement of 
the Commission's regulations is not for discovery but simpiy 
for a notice in clear language which adequately describes the 
act& of the licensee in violation of the law: 
If the hearing is directed towards a 
respondent, [the Commission] shall serve 
on the respondent an order to show cause 
or other notice or order suitable to the 
purposes of the hearrng-which shall set 
forth in ordinary and concise language 
the acts or omissions with which the 
respondent is charged or the issues to be 
determined at the hearing, to the end 
that the respondent will be able to pre-
pare his or its defense. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission Rules of Procedures, 
Rule 8 (1) (a). (Emphasis supplied.) 
It is the language of the "notice" which must be 
clear. There is no requirement for general open discovery, 
as the club implies, to prepare a defense (Club's brief, p.22). 
The club claims a right to a visual inspection of 
agents and to Answers to Interrogatories. However, the club's 
brief cites no authority for such a proposition, and indeed 
there is no authority because there is no right of discovery in 
administrative hearings unless that right is established by 
some legislative or regulatory authority. Any discovery allowed 
in proceedings before the Liquor Control Commission is limited 
to the taking of depositions, Rule 8(14) (a), Utah Liquor Control 
Co11U11ission Rules of Procedure, which were not asked for. 
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Due process does require that certain fundamental 
procedures be available to a licensee. Those required pro-
cedures ~ere in fact satisfied in this case by the notice and 
hearing where Stanyon Street had ample opportunity to get and 
give appropriate information before the Liquor Commission by 
testimony and cross-examination. More than this is not re-
quired. Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 (1977). Nowhere 
has due process ever included a right to a pre-hearing "visual 
inspection" of the liquor law enforcement officers simply for 
the convenience of the club. Not even in a prosecution pursuant 
to the more exacting standards of criminal procedure would a 
defendant have such a right, much less a licensee involved in 
an administrative hearing which results in suspension or revo-
cation of a license. 
CONCLUSION 
It is generally recognized in liquor matters that 
the State has direct authority to protect the welfare of its 
citizens in its own wisdom by licensed privilege or even by r 
absolute prohibition if desired. p 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XXI 
Section 1. The 18th article of amend-
ment to the constitution of the United 
States is hereby repealed. 
Section 2. The transportation or importa-
p; 
pi 
e:x 
tion into any State, Territory or possession Th 
in 
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of the United States for delivery or 
use therein of intoxicating liquors, 
in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited. 
Section 3. [omitted]. 
The 21st Amendment did more than merely repeal the 
18th Amendment. The 21st Amendment allowed to the states the 
exclusive control of liquor subject only to overriding national 
concerns and constitutional protections: 
Section 2 constitutionalized an exception 
to the normal operation of the commerce 
clause [citation omitted]. [Section 2] 
is unique in the constitutional scheme in 
that it represents the only express grant 
of power to the states thereby creating 
a fundamental restructuring of the con-
stitutional scheme as it relates to one 
product - intoxicating liquors. Castle-
wood International Corporation v. Simon, 
596 F.2d 638, (5th Cir. 1979) at p. 642. 
With that grant of power Utah has chosen to extend 
the privilege of possessing, selling and consuming liquor by 
license while maintaining strict control over the storage, 
serving, consumption and sale of liquor subject only to the 
requirements of a constitutional and reasonable regulatory 
procedure. 
In the matter before the Court, the rights of the 
private club, Stanyon Street, were adequately protected. The 
privilege to deal with liquor was requested by the club and 
extended by a state license. Violations in fact did occur. 
The club was given notice of the violations and evidence was 
introduced at a hearing where the club had ample opportunity 
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to ask questions of the witnesses and introduce its own testi-
mony. A violation of the law was found and a penalty was 
assessed. A correct and fair course of proceedings was followec 
which resulted in a moderate suspension of the club's liquor 
license for one week. 
If any of the club's business or operation was re-
stricted at all, it was because of the nature of the chosen 
business. Club Stanyon Street voluntarily subjected itself to 
a stricter control and scrutiny than any ordinary business by 
its own free entry into the private liquor club business. 
Merely because the enforcement officers' conduct was undercover, 
or because their identity was not revealed before the hearing, 
or because the club's officers had no knowledge of the violatior. 1 
at the time it occurred does not impair any of the club's 
constitutional rights regarding their liquor license. What 
rights the club actually has were not violated by the conduct 
of the officers or by the proceedings before the Commission. 
The proceedings were fair, and the order was reasonab:,J 
At all times the Commission acted within lawful authority and 
the record will show that the Commission was not arbitrary or 
. I 
capricious. Respondent respectfully asks that this Court upho1·! 
its order for suspension of the club's liquor license for a om 
week period. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROBERT B. H~~SEN 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. McALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CONSENT TO INSPECTION APPENDIX A 
The undersigned, a non-profit corporation of the State of Utah, 
having applied to the Utah Liquor Control Colll!llission for a license to 
maintain club premises upon which liquor is or will be stored or consumed 
as provided in the Liquor Control Act of 1969 and the provisions of Chapter 
6, Title 16, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, does hereby voluntarily consent arid 
agree that representatives of the Commission, the Citizens council, the Liquor 
Division and law enforcement agencies·may and shall be admitted irmnediately 
to the club house and permitted without hindrance or delay to inspect completely 
the entire club house, club quarters, all books and records of said corporation 
and any locker therein while the club is open for the transaction of business 
to its members, or while members or guests are present. 
The foregoing consent by the undersigned shall become. effective as of 
July 13, 1969, and shall not be withdra~m while the undersigned is licensed 
by the cormnission to operate as a liquor Locker Club or while an application· 
for such license is pending. The undersigned agrees that it will not object 
to the.use of. evidence obtained pursuant to his consent, whether at a c01llllli.ssion 
hearing or in civil or criminal proceedings before the courts or otherwise, when 
used in connection with the enforcement of·the liquor laws of the State of Utah, 
it being understood that the undersigned hereby voluntarily waives whatever · 
constitutional rights it may have had or might have in the future in connection 
with the foregoing. 
Dated this ____ i_s _____ day of __ o_c_t_. ____ 19 --2:__. 
Club Stanyon Street 
Non-profit corporation 
Attest 
"---secr-e.tiiry / 
' 
.... 
/ I / 
STl.TE OF UTAH 
COt~n·y OF __ _,S'"-'a:..:l::..;to.....:L,,,a,,,k'"'e""------
On the ____ 1_s_t_h ___ ~day of ___ o_c_t_ob_e_r_~l9 71 personally 
appeared before me Donald B. McGivney and __ J_o_J_u_l_i_a_n_o __________ _ 
who each being duly s~orn did say, each for himself, that he the said 
Donald B. McGi vney is ffi@'_· _a_T_r_u_s_t_e_e ___________ ( off ice r) 
and he the said Jo Juliano is the secretary of Club Stanyon Street 
(corporation) and that said officers know and 
-cn-d~e-r_s_t_a_n_d_t_h_e _ s_t_a_t_e_m_e_n_t_s_m_a-.d-e--;-h-e_r_e-.i~n-and that their execution thereof is done 
voluntarily and without coercion of any kind and is done by authorization of the 
Board of Directors (Trustees) of said corporation and that said officers acknowledgec 
to me that the corporation executed the same . 
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